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Old spirits of capitalism: Managers and masculine alterity in/as the Korean office 
Michael M. Prentice 
University of Manchester 
 
Abstract 
This article analyzes the aging of a figure of labor: the male Korean office manager. In contrast 
to its normative heyday in late twentieth century East Asia, the figure of the older manager has 
become a devalued and deviant figure in contemporary Korea. Based on ethnography of a 
Korean white-collar woUNSODFH,DUJXHWKDWWKHROGHUPDOHPDQDJHUKDVHPHUJHGDVD³ILJXUHRI
DOWHULW\´WKDWVHHPVWRSHUPHDWHDOODVSHFWVRI.RUHDQFRPSDQ\OLIH%\DWWXQLQJWRKRZLQGH[HV
of this figure are marked across different areas of office life, from everyday narration to policy, I 
show how their negative presence can be cited to justify new office reforms. Younger managers 
shape their own office identities in contrast to older figures, and formal office policies implicitly 
WDUJHWPDQDJHULDOVWHUHRW\SHV$QµROG¶VSLULt of capitalism, embodied in a personified figure, is 
just as central in articulating and differentiating models of capitalist subjectivity and institutional 
identity as a new one. 
 
[Labor, Gender, Korea, Aging, Corporations, Enfiguration] 
 
 
ق Ϣחࡵ ϠѰࢂ ۘघࢉ ଞ˲ Χ۽ یהऐ ˗չ࢕Қࢂ Ϡܫ ୃۘࡶ ٗ۱ଞЬ. 20ۿ̛ 
୯؆ Ѱ߅ݤ߅ࢂ ̍إࢶࢉ ࢷ۽̛߾ ٸ঴߭ ك Ҷ, Οࢇ քࡵ ˗չ࢕ࢂ ଔ̍߭Е ୃо 
ଞ˲ یୣ߾۰ ૡɼ ࢸଜѸˈ ٸࢽۘࢶࢉ ʨࡳԻ ٸ়एˈ ࢑Ь. ଞ˲ ୘ࢇઝ ৡԂ یה 
୚ˁࡶ ׷࣐एࢶ ୃࢠࠉ˱ ˗ࢺࡳԻ ٗ۱ଞ ق Ϣחࡵ Οࢇ քࡵ Χ۽ ˗չ࢕Е ଞ˲ ୣی 
ۢ୛ࢂ ֻҘ ্ִ߾ ݛֲҘ ʨঈԠ ؿࢇЕ ě੉۽ࢂ ଔ̍߭ĜԻ ࢉݥѸˈ ࢑Ьˈ ࣯ࢠଞЬ. 
ऐࡕҚࢂ ۰ܽ߾۰ ୣی ΰٕ ࢽॺ߾ ࢇծ̧̛ए Ьߦଞ ٗߞ߾۰ ࢇ ଔ̍߭ձ ˗ॲଜˈ 
ϢࢂଡࡳԻނ, ࢇҚࢂ ٕࢽࢶࢉ ࣑ࢢɼ ߭ӊʯ ۚԻࡋ یהݨ ʎୂࡶ ࢽк୘ଜЕ і 
ࢉࡈѺ ܹ ࢑Е एձ ؿࠆࣲ ʨࢇЬ. ࢹࡵ ˗չ࢕Қࡵ Οࢇ քࡵ ˗չ࢕Қ˕ о࣏ࢶࢉ 
ࢽ঑۽ࡶ ୉۽ଜֲ ࢉی˗չࢶ ࢽॺࡵ ߎݤࢶࡳԻ ଔ̍߭ࢂ ˈࢽ˗ϙࡶ एּଞЬ. 
ࢂࢉ୘ѹ ୉ۘ߾ ˱ୃѹ ěЗࡵĜ ࢕ق࣯ࢂ ࢽݦࡵ ۚԻࡋ ࢽݦփਾࢇΟ ࢕ق࣯ࢂࢂ 
࣯˗۽˕ ࢿѦࢶࢉ ࢽ঑۽ࢂ ֻљࡶ ૲ୃଜˈ ८ط୘ଜЕ і ࣸࡁଞ ࠇଟࡶ ଞЬ. 
 
[ϠѰ, ۽ط, ଞ˲, Ϡܫ୘, ̛߶, ଔ̍߭୘] 
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****** 
Executive Cho called me into his glass-walled corner office on the fortieth floor of the Sangdo 
Tower on a quiet afternoon during my fieldwork in Seoul. I had been conducting ethnography 
inside the Sangdo Group, a mid-size Korean steel conglomerate (pseudonym), for eight months 
LQDVDQLQWHUQRQ([HFXWLYH&KR¶VKXPDQUHVRXUFHVWHDPLQWKHJURXSKHDGTXDUWHUV1 As I 
sat down across his desk, he asked if I knew of any academic resources in English that theorized 
the differences between Eastern and Western management styles. He was looking for 
authoritative sources that he could cite to study differences among managers about decision-
making. As he explained this, he cast his gaze out behind me, onto the plane of desks in the 
office. He expressed concern about some of the team managers on our floor, and the Sangdo 
Group more broadly. He already had in mind a way to use this model: to distinguish among those 
who made decisions based on emotional reactions and those who made decisions based on 
rational logic. The academic model, which I never found, was meant to prove a hunch: that older 
managers at Sangdo acted emotionally and thus would be unfit to serve as the rational, cool-
headed team managers that Sangdo needed.  
This article addresses how a once normative and singular figure, the office worker 
(hoesawon), has become generationally differentiated in South Korea (henceforth, Korea). 
Despite the fact that annual hiring of college graduates in large cohorts has been a steady feature 
of the Korean white-collar labor market for many years (Korean Labor Institute 2017), the 
contemporary office is perceived to be composed of a basic generational division³VHQLRUV´
ROGHUPDOHPDQDJHUVDQG³MXQLRUV´\RXQJHUPDOHDQGIHPDOHRIILFHZRUNHUV, who come from 
two different worlds. Seniors are generally characterized as career office workers in their 40s and 
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50s who were raised in the early days of Korean industrialization in the 1970s and 80s, whose 
experiences have been extensively shaped by military service, a seniority-based promotion 
system, and hard-working office culture. Juniors are µ\RXQJer¶office workers who grew up in 
the period of globalization, consumption, and individualization of the 1990s and have different 
expectations for boss-subordinate relations, merit-based advancement, and office democracy. 
These two groups appear as from two different cultures that do not understand each other. The 
Sangdo employee magazine even carried a special issue entirely dedicated to bridging the 
communication divide between seniors and juniors. Yet within this divide, the senior, or older 
male manager, has become marked as a ³figure of alterity.´ On television, in newspaper 
headlines, and in mentions in the office, older male managers no longer seem to fit in 
contemporary corporate environments, and more broadly, Korean society. They are linked to a 
range of social and professional ills: an outdated work ethic, poor decision-making, low 
productivity, abuse of power, excessive drinking, high personnel cost, the cause of sexual 
harassment, and demotivators to merit-based promotion. A mid-level Sangdo manager in his 
thirties lamented to me one day that Sangdo would only be successful if they could remove the 
layer of older managers who slowed everything down in the office. A newspaper headline put it 
PRUHEOXQWO\XUJLQJ³2OGPHQ>gocham@KDYHJRWWRJR´attributing blame to their high salaries 
and financial burden on the economy.2 Those within corporations, even those with high-level 
administrative titles like Executive Cho, see themselves apart from the management culture of a 
previous generation and in positions to develop new ways of improving corporate processes and 
office culture, rationally and scientifically. While older male managers may be seen as 
economically unproductive members of contemporary corporate society, the figure itself is 
culturally productive for articulating and motivating new reforms to office social life and 
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corporate practices, part of a ³MXVWLILFDWRU\UHJLPH´WROHgitimize a new era of national capitalism 
(Boltanski and Chiapello 2018). %ROWDQVNLDQG&KLDSHOOR¶VFRQFHSWRIa ³QHZ spirit of 
FDSLWDOLVP´ZDVPHDQWWRVKRZFDVHWhe emergence of the managerial hero as an aspirational 
figure to legitimize global capitalist change in France in the 1990s. This figure was implicitly 
contrasted with anti-figures of authoritarian FDSLWDOLVPVXFKDV³SHWW\W\UDQWV´ in the office who 
served as oppositional examples of ³\HVWHUGD\¶VHQHPLHV´ In this article, I explore 
how a markedly old spirit of capitalism, manifested in the bad behaviors of aging male 
managers, provides the moral force to de-legitimate certain occupants in the office landscape as 
well as to furnish a recognizable anti-register of good sociality to populate new visions of the 
Korean workplace. 
7KHILJXUHRIWKH³salaryman´has populated academic accounts of East Asian capitalist 
subjectivities for half a century, emerging first as an aspirational figure in accounts of Japan, 
where dutiful white-collar men contributed to the peaceful, post-war transformation of Japan into 
a middle-class society (Vogel 1963). White-collar office work3 in Korea emerged within the 
FRQWH[WRIDVKDUS³FRPSUHVVHGPRGHUQLW\´(Chang 1999) in which village agricultural life 
rapidly turned to urban office-based salary work (Janelli and Yim 1993). In Japan, the salaryman 
remains as a common sociological point of reference, D³JKRVW´RID³JOREDOEUHDGZLQQHU
LPDJLQDU\´QRZSDVW(LeBlanc 2012). In Korea, the older and gendered office worker has 
emerged not as a relic of past national success or industrialist nostalgia (see Muehlebach and 
Shoshan 2012), but as a figure of alterity that plagues the present. Figures of alterity are not 
simply reviled or taboo social types, but act as models of deviance against which other identities 
are rendered normal and unmarked (Goffman 1974, Hastings and Manning 2004, 304, see also 
Hall 2014). Such figures do not always appear as coherent voices enacted in individual 
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performances, but emerge through the comments of observers who can locate, cite, and analyze 
discrete signs of their presence (Inoue 2006, Smith 2010). The practice of narrating or 
commenting about such figures forms a reflexive practice to justify social relationships in the 
present. For example, Ogasawara (1998, 89-90) has described the figure of the ojisan ³XQFOH´RU
³PLVWHU´VWHUHRW\SHof older office men in Japan with poor style and boorish habits, regularly 
lampooned by younger female office workers in gossip and magazines. Reflexive practice 
locates traces of such figures in multiple locations, suggesting evidence of their ubiquity and 
influence, which keen observers can point out. The practice of pointing out behavioral and 
communicative qualities, however emergent, of such anti-heroes provides motivating foil for 
new imaginaries in the ongoing dialectics of organizational change (see also Cohen 2015).  
In contrast to other marked victims of contemporary white-collar office cultures (e.g., 
Lynch 2012, Molé 2012, Kim 2015a), older male managers in Korea engender feelings of both 
sympathy and revulsion.4 On one hand, they are victims of D³PLGGOHageism´based on an idea 
that older workers are simply too outdated for modern offices (Gullette 1998). On the other hand, 
ROGHUPHQDUHEODPHGIRURWKHUV¶PLVHULHVLQWKHRIILFHIURPYHUEDODEXVHRI\RXQJHUPHQWR
sexual harassment of younger women. In this sense, they stand ambiguously between labor and 
management: they may have a situational power as literal ³PDQDJHUV´(bujang or gwajang rank) 
but are not part of the executive or owning class, and can themselves be subject to retributive 
action from those above. My concern in this article lies not in adjudicating their status as power-
victims or power-abusers. Nor am I concerned with their sociological existence as a discrete 
class or generation of worker with marked characteristics ± this after all was precisely what 
Executive Cho attempted to do. Rather, I outline how the aged figure becomes a productive zone 
of differentiation in contemporary offices, akin to the way age and generation function as modes 
 6 
 
of moral distinction in other anthropological accounts (Rutherford 2013, Lamb 2015). Anti-
manager stances shape individual narratives, corporate branding campaigns, and human 
resources policies, showing a productivity beyond mere stereotypification. Diffuse qualities of 
µolder manager-ness¶ appear to affect (or infect) diverse qualities of office life, like decision-
making, office layouts, the conduct of social activities, and the conduct of younger workers.  
This article brings an attention to the semiotic dimensions of enfigurement ± by looking 
at the diverse signs through which figures become identifiable or salient in practice ± with 
conceptions of the political composition of organizational or institutional orders themselves. 
Typified voices and general institutional registers are closely linked (Agha 2005) and it is not 
uncommon, either in folk conceptions or anthropological accounts, to reify corporations as 
typified figures, persons, or actors in their own right (i.e., the corporate µperson¶) which are often 
highlighted as figures of alterity in their own right, with distinct motives and sociopathic wills 
for profit or control (see Bakan 2004). Where for Marx ³the capitalist is only capital 
personified,´ (Marx 1978 [1867], Vol. 1, Ch. 4), the process can also go the other direction: 
capitalist institutions can also take on the qualities of persons and personas. Older male managers 
in Korea appear in reflexive explanations DVILJXUHVERWKµLQ¶DQGµDV¶FRUSRUDWHRUJDQL]DWLRQV
appearing to control events, norms, the conduct of others, and the efficiency of work. So-called 
³WHQ-thousand-\HDUPDQDJHUV´ (mannyeon bujang) in Korea are seen as illegitimate occupants in 
companies that emphasize merit-based advancement. Critiques of HOGHUV¶misdeeds thus ground 
virtuous managers and employees as the merited inhabitants of coveted economic positions. 
This article traces how the figure of the older male manager has been reconfigured from a 
singular position of normative aspiration, closely linked to a late-industrializing spirit, to a figure 
of alterity, a negative stereotype from which actors dis-align both as a matter of individual 
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identity and corporate image. I first discuss the µaging¶of the Korean office worker as a specific 
kind of chronotopic differentiation, common in other Korean figures of personhood. I then turn 
to the Sangdo office to look at how individual managers distinguish themselves from this figure 
in everyday office discourse. Like the invisible decision-making qualities intuited by Executive 
Cho, the older manager shows up often as an absent present, the discovery of which grants 
younger managers purchase on diagnosing problems in the office. I then address how implicit 
older manager VWHUHRW\SHVFRQWULEXWHWRDQHPHUJHQW³DQWL-UHJLVWHU´IRUEUDQG-level publicity as a 
way of projecting an image of progressive office culture. In the final empirical section, I discuss 
how qualities of the older manager entered into new HR techniques that intended to scientifically 
delineate concrete and discrete signs of older male manager-ness.  
An Aged Figure 
In both scholarly and native imaginations of capitalist success, the figure of the full-time office 
worker has played a key role in Korea as well as Japan (Vogel 1963, Rohlen 1974, Kim 2018 
[2001]). This figure spurred national economic development, buttressed an emerging middle-
class society, and provided a vision for social progress in industrializing post-war societies. 
)LHOGZRUNLQ.RUHDLQWKHVGHSLFWHGWKH³RUJDQL]DWLRQPHQ´RI6HRXOZKRUHSODFHGWKH
yangban (landed aristocrats) as the new figure of male status and success (Christie 1972), a 
theme later picked up by Janelli (Janelli and Yim 1993) who described the transition from an 
agriculture society to a modern capitalist one populated by a new generation of office workers.5 
The preponderance of academic attention on the salaryman phenomenon in Japan has been 
critiqued by Japan scholars for its implicit assumptions of middle-class stability and 
normalization of the hetero-male subject, images that never clearly articulated with a reality that 
included both female labor participation and non-normative men (Brinton 1993, Roberson and 
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Suzuki 2003). Nevertheless, the salaryman and office worker in Japan and Korea, respectively, 
continue to play significant roles as gendered figures that channel ideas of biographic, family, 
economic, and national success or failure. 
The salaryman or office worker as a white-collar warrior and family breadwinner is what 
(UYLQJ*RIIPDQZRXOGKDYHGHVFULEHGDVD³VWDJHG´ILJXUH*RIIPDQGHOLQHDWHGW\SHV of figures 
WKDWDQLPDWHSHUIRUPDQFHVRIWKHVHOIIURPWKH³QDWXUDOILJXUHV´WKDWDOLJQWRRXUELRJUDSKLFDO
identities (who we feel we are) WRILJXUHVRI³DOWHULW\´(who we feel we are not) (Goffman 1974, 
496±559, Hastings and Manning 2004). Staged figures can be those one aspires to align their 
own life events with, eliding a natural figure with a normative one, such as becoming a 
³breadwinner.´ +RZHYHUWKHSURFHVVRIDOLJQLQJRQH¶VVHOIWRFHUWDLQNLQGVof staged figures is 
itself an ongoing performance, and not always successful: in Japan, the salaryman figure has 
become ruptured from its material potential DV³actual VDODU\PHQIDGHLQWRWKHSDVW´/HEODQF
2012,867, emphasis added). Allison has described madogiwazoku or ³salarymen that µsit by 
windows¶´EHFDXVHWKH\KDYHIDLOHGDWJHWWLQJSURPRWHGEXWFDQQRWEHILUHG(Allison 1994, 98).  
This rupture between biographic lives and staged figures has also emerged in Korea, 
where discussions of gender have long focused on the ³JHQGHULQJRIPRGHUQLW\,´ associations of 
men with patriotism and industrialism, and women with care and family (Cheng 2011, Cho 1988, 
Kendall 2002, Kim and Choi 1998, Moon 1998). Large corporations were particularly formative 
in forging gendered distinctions between work and home (Jo 2004; Kendall 2002, 7). In the 
financialized or neoliberalized era since the late 1990s, a distinction between productive and 
non-productive work has also been applied within gendered work categories, such as those men 
who contribute more to the nation than other men (Song 2009, Kim 2018 [2001]). This fissure 
has become exacerbated as the possibilities of obtaining a full-time corporate-track job (not to 
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mention earning steady promotions) have become increasingly competitive in new millennium 
Korea. Yet the societal obsession of attaining a salaried corporate position as the payoff to 
educational investment has persisted. The ability for individuals to develop the social, 
educational and professional capital to inhabit such a figure in their biographical lives remains 
more and more elusive, dependent on the acquisition of a host of soft and hard skills beginning 
HDUO\LQRQH¶VHGXFDWLRQ(Abelmann, Park, and Kim 2009), despite idealized depictions of their 
attainment as based simply on hard work (Park 2010). Against a background of largely 
unachievable white-collar dreams, Elfving-Hwang (2017) has observed how mediatized 
depictions of apathetic male managers on television reflect a new ambivalence towards office 
work, company loyalty, and individual success in general. Depictions like these represent a 
rupture between the alignment of a biographical self and an idealized figure of office work, a 
rupture that has resonated as more authentic for empathetic viewers (for ethnographic examples, 
see Lee 2002, Chung 2009) ± DSKHQRPHQRQ*RIIPDQZRXOGKDYHFDOOHG³UROHGLVWDQFLQJ´
(Goffman 1961).6  
Age or generation functions as a significant anchor for making economic distinctions. 
Comaroff and Comaroff (1999) described the elderly being blamed by youth for the empty 
promises of global capitalism in post-apartheid South Africa in the early 1990s.7 Following the 
1997 financial crisis in Korea, Kim (2018 [2001]) described how blue-collar steel workers ± 
once heralded as the ³IORZHUV´(ggot) of the labor force ± began to differentiate among 
themselves, emphasizing skills and abilities as metonymic points of differentiation.8 Because 
older male employees are seen as the inheritors of a high-earning wage system from a previous 
era (known as hobongje RU³VHQLRULW\V\VWHP´WKH\DUHSDUWLFXODUO\WDUJHWHGHYHQthough the 
actual numbers of high-status positions are relatively few in any given corporation. And it makes 
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sense that the targets for these are specifically male, as high-up positions in the large industrial 
conglomerates skews male.9 (Sangdo, typical of the Korean steel industry, had a workforce more 
than 90 percent male). Efforts to curb the demographic woes wrought by an aging workforce 
(such as raising the retirement age from 58 to 60 in 2013; see OECD 2018) may in fact 
exacerbate feelings of older worker-profiteering in positions that should be occupied by more 
deserving inhabitants. 
During the period of my graduate fieldwork among white-collar workers (2011-2017), I 
frequently encountered collected media images of older male managers. These images had 
recognizable visual/linguistic features, such as a rough voice quality, outdated office wear, the 
XVHRI³KDOI-VSHHFK´banmal or informal talk, to subordinates), and depiction of illicit behaviors, 
such as drinking, smoking, or taking bribes. These were counterposed against younger male and 
female office workers who were sincere, progressive, and able to express meta-commentary in 
contrast to their aloof and unchanging bosses. The distinction was made salient within staged 
interactional scenes, where an older manager would burst into a fit of anger at the poor quality of 
a subordinate¶VZRUNor make co-workers go for an unwanted drink. Figure 1 illustrates four 
media characterizations of older male managers in which negative depictions are embedded 
within interactional routines, involving conflicts with markedly younger employees, who are 
staged as innocent victims of an oppressive corporate culture manifested in the older male 
manager. These scenes frequently take place within scenes of office work itself ± the moment of 
submitting documents, making presentations, walking down the hallway, or at after-work 
dinners, such that the figure of the older managers permeates all corners of office life, from work 
to (supposedly) non-work. 
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Figure 1: Four examples of older male manager depictions that index negative 
interactional behavior. Top left: from the television drama An Incomplete Life 
(Misaeng), the manager Ma, played by Son Jong-hak, aggressively yells at a 
lower-ranking manager. Top right: an angry manager from the comic series Gaus 
Electronics, gets angry (left) and then cools his tone (right) in embarrassment. 
Bottom left: from the television drama, The Awl (Song-got), the manager Koh, 
played by Gong Jeong Hwan, violently forces a junior worker to drink a full cup 
of soju, a common Korean liquor. Bottom right: a nameless, aloof manager in the 
satirical musical sketch series Let It Be, played by Lee Dong-yun, thinks out-loud, 
VD\LQJ³:KRVKRXOG,IRUFHWRSUHVHQWDWWKHQH[WPHHWLQJ"´(DFKH[DPSOHQRW
only pits older managers against younger ones, but their behavior is marked by 
excessive reactions in generic work scenes.  
 
 
The figure emerges as a typified interactional stance premised on acts of negative reciprocity 
(Sahlins 1972, 195-6) ² that is, acts that take away RWKHUV¶WLPHODERURUGLJQLW\,QWKLVVHQVH
it is not simply one who drinks excessively, but one who forces others to drink against their will; 
not one who shows diligence by working late, but who forces others to work late.10 And these 
singular interactional violations are regularly invoked not just as a corporate problem, but a 
national problem too. In cultural critic Kang Jun-PDQ¶VWHUPV.RUHDQVRFLHW\DVDZKROHLV
FRPSRVHGRI³DOSKDV´gap) DQG³EHWDV´eul) (Kang 2013). While social elites are often targeted 
for their negative behavior (gapjil, akin to ³alpha-abuse´) towards commoners, a frequently 
occurring example of the ³alpha´ type is the older male manager, such as the famous case of ³WKH
ramen executive´ramyeon sangmu) in 2013. A male corporate executive berated a female 
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airline attendant for improperly cooking his instant noodles. In these cases, ³betas´DUHlow-
ranking employees or service workers who endure emotional abuse DWHOGHU¶VKDQGV. (This binary 
understanding of power-abuse has also formatted the MeToo movement in Korea where 
hierarchical work relations have become particularly potent sites for finding systemic abuses.) 
Though Kang ultimately argues that everyone in Korea must deal with the problem of secretly 
wanting to be an alpha, the commonly circulating images of abusive older managers and meek 
junior employees reify these two positions DV³FDUGLQDOSRLQWVRIRULHQWDWLRQ´(Wilf 2015b, 21) in 
white-collar office life.  
The office worker, then, should not be taken as a singular figure in Korea in contrast to 
other figures of labor, but rather as a split one: a negative depiction RI³ROGHUPHQ´gocham) or 
³PDQDJHUV´bujang, gwajang) that co-exists alongside a positive one of hardworking and 
suffering young male and female workers (jig-won). The dichotomization of the office worker 
ILJXUHEHWZHHQWKRVH³ROGHU´ DQG³\RXQJHU´IROORZVDIDPLOLDUELQDU\RIFRQWUDVWLQJSHUVRQW\SHV
found in other Korean figures that make salient higher-order scales of social distinction, such as, 
domestic-international, old-young, traditional-modern, and rural-urban (Kendall 1985, Harkness 
2011). :KHUHROGPHQDUH³KDUG´\RXQJPHQDUHQRZ³VRIW´(Jung 2010). These distinctions are, 
needless to say, inherently value-laden. They signal not just new visions of a progressive future 
but provide moral justification for them: the older male manager figure, despite once being 
categorized as modern, urban, and wealthy, has been recategorized to the marked position of 
alterity through perceptions of his non-productive presence, weight on the economy, harm to 
social progress, and parasitic presence on merit-based professional achievement. Because of his 
inherited high status (as a long-serving employee who cannot be fired), he is seen as not worthy 
to occupy such privileged spots in a neo-liberalizing economy premised on individual success 
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(cf. Molé 2012, Kim 2018 [2001]). Temporal distinctions EHWZHHQDQ³ROG´DQGD³QHZ´.RUHDn 
office culture are thus rendered salient to publics through literal old and young person-types that 
cohere across contexts and modalities. Situating them in the past articulates with a reliable 
Korean chronotope in which the past is seen as rough, harsh, and undeveloped, qualities that 
inhere in qualities of people and objects (Harkness 2013). Frequently depicting older male 
managers as not only outdated and old but abusive, inefficient, or self-profiting means that they 
are not just out of place but hurting those in the present. It also provides justification for social 
retributions they might face from legitimate figures of authority, such as company ownership or 
the human resources department.  
Everyday Dis-alignments 
For rank-stratified employees in the Korean office, identifying who an older manager is (and is 
not) is a different kind of task from configuring them in the media. The distinction between 
³PDQDJHPHQW´DQG³ODERU´LVQRWHPSLULFDOO\FOHDULQDQRIILFHVHWWLQJDVPDQ\MREWLWOHVHQFRGH
³PDQDJHU´-jangLQWKHPVXFKDV³DVVLVWDQWPDQDJHU´ (chajang), and ranks are arbitrarily 
stratified in four or five-year increments.11 All employees have some bounded authority in terms 
RIZRUNUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV0RUHRYHURIILFHHQYLURQPHQWVWKHPVHOYHVDUHFRPSOH[³JHQUH
HFRORJLHV´(Spinuzzi and Zachry 2000) that are marked by a plurality of modalities of 
documentation, interaction, and other forms of literacy which structures local participation (such 
as meetings) and through which authority relations are mediated. In this sense, it is rare to 
encounter highly coherent tropes or images of older managers in the office ± they exist instead 
across interactional performances (Kiesling 2001). This makes them no less salient, however, as 
indexical traces (as in, contiguously- or causally-linked signs) of this figure can appear in almost 
any kind of office activity or narrativization. For male managers in their thirties and forties that I 
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interacted with at Sangdo, I regularly encountered these kinds of complaints, reflecting a 
pragmatic attempt to dis-align from being taken as the µbad kind¶ of older manager themselves 
(see Lamb [FRUWKFRPLQJ@RQGLVFRXUVHVRI³QRWEHLQJROG´ 
The following example is illustrative. While having lunch with a team of employees from 
another Sangdo department, the boss, Executive Kang, asked me what new projects the HR team 
was working on. I relayed that HR was developing a new 360-degree feedback technique for the 
development of executives and team managers. 360-degree feedback, originally popularized in 
American management theory, is a form of evaluation in which subordinates, peers, and 
superiors provide anonymous feedback about an individual (usually a manager). Executive 
Kang, himself having worked for an American consulting firm in Korea prior to joining Sangdo, 
was familiar with the technique. He was convinced that the HR team at Sangdo would have a 
tough time implementing it, because more traditional Korean managers would not be able to 
handle the feedback. This was because it conflicted with their common mode of authority: 
JLYLQJQRWUHFHLYLQJIHHGEDFN7KHVHPDQDJHUVKHVDLGZRXOGJHWD³VKRFN´ at not being able 
to control their anger at ³gossip´ about them from below, while American managers were more 
able to handle blunt feedback. In painting these emergent contrasts, listed in Table 1, Executive 
.DQJPDUNHGRXWDFXOWXUDOGLYLVLRQEHWZHHQPDQDJHUVZKR³FDQ´DGDSWWRWKLQJV³JOREDO´DQd 
WKRVHZKR³FDQQRW´DQGWKRVHZKRFDQVWD\FDOPDQGWKRVHZKRORVHWKHLUFRROHQILJXULQJthe 
imaginary Korean manager as not fit for modern feedback techniques. In doing so, he used 
different reported speech elements to voice the manager who, upon getting feedback from his 
subordinates, would retaliate against them with particularly harsh language.12 
$(PHUJHQWFRQWUDVWVLQ([HFXWLYH.DQJ¶VQDUUDWLYH 
 
Older Korean manager Global manager 
Retaliating against feedback Accepting of feedback 
Losing composure Maintaining composure 
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Working at Korean company Working at global company 
³-\HDUZRUNHUV´ 
³&RQWURO-RULHQWHG´QLWSLFNLQJ 
 
[none] 
Visionary 
 
 
B. Imagined speech of older male managers 
 
Korean English 
³JHXVHJJLQXJXQ\DJR´ >$VNLQJ@³ZKRLVWKDW62%´ 
³QXJDVVHRQ\DJR´ >$VNLQJ@³ZKRZURWHWKLV´ 
³MDOJRFK\HRUD´ >6D\LQJ@³IL[LWZHOO´>LH³\RXNQRZZKDWWR
ZULWH´@ 
 
Table 1: Examples of qualitative contrasts (A) between older male managers 
and global managers, and voiced speech stereotypes (B) from Executive 
.DQJ¶VLPSURPSWXGHVFULSWLRQDWOXQFK 
 
 
 
Here Executive Kang used a distinction between American and Korean managers as a way to 
make a distinction within Korean manager types.13 Citing this figure through contrasts (A) and 
marked voicings (B) grounds his own identity in oppositional terms (see Hall 2014). Kang 
himself was only in his mid-forties but demographically and organizationally indistinguishable 
from the ³older´ type managers at a similar rank or age with him. In fact, his position was higher 
and his age lower than some of the recognizable µold¶ men around the office. After this 
exchange, Executive Kang went further, enacting a mock 360-degree feedback session right at 
the lunch table: he asked his team members what kind of style of manager they thought he was. 
One of his team members, a junior PDQDJHUFRPPHQWHGWKDWKHZDVD³YLVLRQDU\GLFWDWRU´
$QRWKHUIROORZHGE\VD\LQJWKDWKHZDVD³YLVLRQDU\IDFLOLWDWRU´%RWKXVHG(QJOLVKORDQZRUGV
garnering laughs for the over-the-top flattery. The jokes here were double-layered: in one sense, 
they were telling the executive what he wanted to hear by showering him with phony praise. In 
another sense, they were also avoiding specifically labeling him one or the other type, instead 
combining them into oxymoronic descriptors ³YLVLRQDU\´DQG³GLFWDWRU´ZKLFK([HFXWLYH.DQJ
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and the other team members found quite clever. Even though Kang took advantage of his 
situational authority to put his team members on the spot, he nevertheless proved his own point: 
he could handle direct teasing from his own subordinates without losing his cool. In this setting, 
then, the figure of the older manager provided inspiration for working out what kind of subjects 
the executive and managers thought themselves to be. The negative figure, then, has a narrative 
utility for amusement or humor, even in the absence of any real such manager present. 
In other contexts, being construed as a certain type of manager can prove a formative 
dimenVLRQRIRQH¶VRIILFHSHUVRQD0RUHWKDQMXVWFKDUDFWHURORJLFDOGLVWLQFWLRQVKDYLQJD
reflexive stance to the office and its characters can mark one an experienced lay ethnographer of 
the office itself, especially via complaint (Weeks 2004, Wästerfors 2008). That is, the act of 
hunting for signs marks one not just as the opposite in a pair of manager types, but as one who 
demonstrates better analytical qualities. Team Manager Jang on the Human Resources team, 
under whom I worked as an intern during my fieldwork, frequently exhibited savvy at finding 
signs of older manager presence around the office. As we daily rode the elevator or talked in the 
hallway, he frequently alerted my attention to the invisible aspects of the older manager on our 
floor or in the tower in general. The targets of his rebukes ZHUH³ROGER\V´oldeuboi),14 a term 
that refers narrowly to tight-knit male cliques from middle or high school. The term can also 
refer to those who have worked at one company or conglomerate their entire careers, are trained 
in diverse managerial fields,15 and maintain strong company loyalty. Team Manager Jang, 
himself a transplant from another conglomerate, detested those kinds of managers precisely 
because they lacked the specialized expertise that he had developed in his career and were eager 
to appear as yes-men for higher ups. Marking off features of their behavior ± such as their 
rougher ways of speaking, poor command of English, or harsh treatment of their own 
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subordinates ± Team Manager Jang framed himself as a friendly, progressive manager. He did 
this specifically in ways that contrasted the familiar tropes of older managers, such as telling his 
own employees to go home on time, speaking to them in polite or neutral speech, and pointedly 
asking for opinions in meetings. In many ways, these were emergent across different activities: 
where other team managers had formalized team meetings in the conference room, Team 
Manager Jang would hold them in cozy coffee shops outside the building; where other team 
managers took their employees to go drinking after work, Team Manager Jang encouraged 
playing games, going to fun restaurants, or singing karaoke together.16 It is worth noting that the 
age differences between Team Manager Jang and other managers around the office was slight ± 
all were between late thirties and early fifties ± however, for him, they were of an entirely 
different generation.  
Team Manager Jang would often find traces of old boy behavior in the conduct of young 
workers as well. This became apparent while reviewing the results of an annual employee 
satisfaction survey. The survey was sent out to a few thousand non-managerial, white-collar 
ZRUNHUVDFURVVWKHJURXS¶VVXEVLGLDULHVDVNLQJDERXWVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWKWKHLUTXDOLW\RIRIILFHOLIH
It was meant to be conducted in private, alone, and anonymously. When the results came back, 
the office that was expected to have the lowest results (because of its more military-like internal 
office culture) reported the highest satisfaction rates in the entire group, responding almost 
XQIDLOLQJO\³´PRVWVDWLVILHGRQWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKHLUKDSSLQHVVLQWKHLUMREV7R7HDP
Manager Jang, these results were clearly aberrant, a sign of either direct pressure from their 
bosses or simply an internalized awareness that employees should know how to respond when 
asked for an opinion that could negatively implicate their boss. What we might consider as a 
JHQHUDOQRUPDWLYHRUGHURI³RIILFHFXOWXUH´ZDVLQIDFWVHHQE\7HDP0DQDJHU-DQJDs a sign of 
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the power of individual team managers to suppress the individual thoughts of regular (i.e. non-
managerial) employees. The figure of alterity was not just a negative aspect of office life needing 
to be reformed ± it was also the mechanism stopping efforts to do so. 
Pointing out or drawing on the qualities of older male managers features prominently in 
the way that other men differentiate themselves. Moreover, having the acuity to analyze the 
presence of these signs ± especially the more covert they are ± becomes a higher-order sign of 
RQH¶VUHIOH[LYHLQVWLWXWLRQDONQRZOHGJHLQJHQHUDO, DQLFRQRIWKH³H[SHUWDQDO\VW´TXDOLW\RI
modern management. The ³expert´-ification of identifying older managers is not limited to 
hallway commentary; later in the article I show how HR members developed rational techniques 
for categorizing bad managerial qualities. In the next section, I address how taking anti-older 
manager stances has become a salient way to frame progressiveness in employer-brand 
campaigns. 
 
An Anti-Register  
In 2010, the national Ministry of Gender Equality and Family promoted a new office policy 
NQRZQDV³)DPLO\'D\´gajok-ui nal). On Family Day, typically every Wednesday, government 
employees were forced to leave work at the official stopping time (usually 5:30 p.m.) to go home 
and spend time with their families. Many corporations also adopted the policy as a sign of 
alignment with government goals and an indication of their progressive work cultures. A few of 
the Sangdo Group companies had adopted it as well. One office I observed played a song over 
the company loudspeaker at 5:30 sharp to remind employees to leave. A few minutes later, 
employees from the HR department circled the floor to encourage stragglers. By forcing 
HPSOR\HHVWROHDYHHDUO\WKLVSROLF\DSSHDUVWRFRPEDW.RUHD¶VJOREDOUHSXWDWLRQIRUORQJZRUN
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hours. But the particular shape of the policy and the way it is enforced provide a clue as to what 
the underlying cause of these long hours seems to be. While making no explicit mention of it, the 
policy encourages being away from work and the pressures of attuning WRRQH¶VVXSHULRUV:KHQ
HR workers walk through an office, they are severing the invisible chains of authority between 
boss and employee that link signs of visible self-sacrifice to relations of fealty.17 
Campaigns like Family Day draw on stereotypes of older manager behavior, a feature 
now part of the broader landscape of employer brand and office social policy making. Public 
relations and human resources departments market workplaces as positive places to work 
through company culture campaigns to current employees and potential recruits. Literature on 
corporate persons/personas has often focused on the fictive creation of corporate souls 
(Marchand 1998) or persons that mimic real-life persons or virtuous citizens (Shever 2008, Rajak 
2011) in relations with the public. Korean conglomerates, the average of which has roughly 
twenty distinct subsidiaries, rarely depict themselves as good citizen persons that coalesce 
around a legal or branded entity.18 Rather, contemporary campaigns humanize office work as a 
positive social space through an anti-register of older manager sign-posting. 
Family Day creates a poetic contrast through the reversal of the negative icon of staying 
late with fictive kin coworkers by emphasizing going home early to be with RQH¶Vreal kin. Other 
corporate culture reforms pick up more subtle cues. When I interviewed the HR director of 
Sangdo South, another subsidiary in the Sangdo Group, he glowingly told me of the myriad new 
office policies his department had initiated for improving ³LQWHUQDOFRPSDQ\FXOWXUH´sanae 
munhwa). These included: 1) DQ³HFR-RIILFH´SURJUDPWKDWLQVtalled indoor plants in each team 
area, 2) the institution of after-work sports leagues such as bowling, hiking, and soccer, 3) a 
billiards tournament, 4) small-group meet-ups for workers of similar ranks, and 5) new 
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guidelines for company after-hours socializing or hoesik. 7KHILUVWLVDQDWWHPSWWR³QDWXUDOL]H´
the office space, an otherwise bare arrangement of desks that follows a hierarchical pattern, from 
low to high according to rank. The second, third, and fourth programs promote alternative 
socializing activities that emphasize collective, fun, team-based activities, exhibiting a degree of 
distinction from older manager-marked activities, like drinking, that are unhealthy, hierarchical, 
and parasitic on team-based relations. In the fifth case, HR managers redefined hoesik, an 
activity that generally FRQQRWHV.RUHD¶VFRUSRUDWHGULQNLQJFXOWXUHWRLWVbroader denotational 
PHDQLQJRI³company dining´7KHJXLGHOLQHVVXJJHVWHGWKDWWHDPVDQGPDQDJHUVFRXOG
participate in doing volunteer work, reading books together, or going to the movies with co-
ZRUNHUVDVSRVVLEOHVXEVWLWXWHVIRU³UHJXODU´hoesik. This image of wholesome activities was 
reinforced in the Sangdo employee magazine, where colorful spreads in every issue portrayed 
two or three employees (usually one young man and one young woman) engaged in small-group 
activities, like cooking, coffee-tasting, or paper-making, reinforcing ideas of non-alcoholic, 
gender-equal, and pro-social forms of hoesik done during the day-time. 
One of the most visible policies adopted by many large corporate groups has been the 
³SROLF\´LVWKHQDWLRQDOHPHUJHQF\WHOHSKRQHQXPEHULQ.RUHD7KHSROLF\VWLSXODWHV
that company credit cards should only be used SD\IRU³´UHVWDXUDQWZLWK³´W\SHRIDOFRKRO
XQWLO³´SP$Q\WKLQJEH\RQGWKRVHFRQGLWLRQVshould not be covered by company credit cards. 
6RPHFRPSDQLHVLQVWLWXWHGWKHLURZQYDULDWLRQVVXFKDV³´RU³´WRH[SUHVVFUHDWLYH
differences.) The effect was to officially minimize time in quasi-office related activities by 
cutting off managerial authority to use discretionary funds excessively. Similarly, another 
SURJUDPNQRZQDV³FOHDQFDUG´ZDVDOVRZLGHO\DGRSWHGDPRQJ.RUHDQFRPSDQLHVLQZKLFK
attempts to use company cards at bars with illicit names or any attempt to swipe a company card 
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after midnight would be refused electronically and flagged for auditing. Together with these 
policies, a new lexicon of descriptors for hoesik has also emerged distancing it from its more 
illicit connotationsGHVFULELQJLWDV³KHDOWK\´geong-ganhan³ZKROHVRPH´ (geonjeonhan) or 
VLPSO\³DOWHUQDWLYH´isaek). 
The older managerial stereotype is not directly named in these policies but is indirectly 
cued by mere mention (such as hoesik) or topical focus (such as emphasis on leaving on time). 
This indirectness resembles other forms of FRUSRUDWH³GRXEOHVSHDN´(Lutz 1989) RU³FRUSRUDWH
R[\PRURQV´(Benson and Kirsch 2010) usually signaled to the public as part of public relations 
campaigns. Given that campaigns in Korea are also directed to employees, such indirectness 
reflects the delicate nature of directly castigating a perceived sub-group of current employees ± 
and one known for retributive abuse, to boot. Attempts to restrict drinking or smoking may be 
seen as targeting a certain group, but encouraging movie-watching or book-clubs cannot be 
easily mis-attributed. Thus, internal discourses contrast with treatment of managers in the public 
realm, where harsh and moralizing descriptors circulate of specific individuals. We can see this 
in the basic GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQZRUGVIRU³ROGPHQ´that circulate in public (oldeuboi, gocham, 
or ggondae) which place emphasis on their age, versus their internal reference where managers 
DUHUHIHUUHGWRQHXWUDOO\VXFKDV³WKRVHDERYH´wit-saram) or even affectionately, such as 
³seniors´ in English. This pattern of reference ± critical in the public sphere, evasive or indirect 
in the company sphere ± does not mean that such policies merely appease older male managers.19 
In fact, this ³DQWL-UHJLVWHU´GLUHFWO\WDUJHWs personnel issues surrounding older managers using 
flowery, positive, or neutral terms, as listed in Table 2 below. Terms such as myeong-ye toejik 
(³HPHULWXVUHWLUHPHQW´) refer to programs for coerced early retirement while terms such as 
³samjin auteu´ RU³WKUHHVWULNHVDQG>\RX¶UH@RXW´a baseball term that refers to a general policy 
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for all employee evaluations, but one specifically geared to those who might receive bad 
evaluations as managers over multiple years. 
Terms for referring to policies surrounding older male managers 
Korean Direct translation Actual policy 
myeong-ye 
toejik
  
emeritus retirement incentivized early retirement 
isaek 
hoesik
  
alternative company dining non-drinking work events 
hoching supyeonghwa title horizontalization 
 
rank reductions 
samjin auteu three strikes [DQG\RX¶UH@RXW performance-review based 
dismissal 
illyeok jeokchae haeso workforce accumulation 
resolution 
 
fixing overstaffing 
keullin kadeu clean card ban on illicit use of company 
credit card 
Table 2: Indirect references to activities or actions surrounding older managers 
that have become taboo to directly refer to. 
 
We should certainly be skeptical of efforts that Korean companies (and companies in general) 
WDNHLQFUDIWLQJH[SOLFLW³FXOWXUDO´PRGHOVRIWKHPVHOYHV (cf. Kunda 1992). As Hagen Koo (2001) 
has noted for Korea, corporate culture programs in WKHV³XVHGSDWHUQDOLVWLFODQJXDJHDQG
symbols to recreate the pseudo-family sharing a common economic fate among the members of 
WKHFRPSDQ\´LQWKHIDFHRIGLYLVLYHODERUSROLFLHV7RGD\however, corporate policies 
suggest a public stance against older father-figures, both from a labor standpoint (as seen by the 
proliferation of early retirement policies) and from a social standpoint (as seen by the internal 
crackdowns on drinking, smoking and other marked activities). As a circulating set of references, 
signs of older managerial presence are a productive form of differentiation for those not 
identifying with those kinds of figures, such as companies attempting to redefine their internal 
and external images, through real and fictive family belonging. 
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Expert Solutions to Managerial Problems 
To return to the discussion at the outset of this article, the scientific modelling of differences 
between managers can lend more legitimacy to efforts to oust older managers than performances 
or marketing do, but can also be more elusive. For Executive Cho and Team Manager Jang on 
the HR team, this was a matter of their professional expertise in human resources. Even though 
they had intuitive senses of which men on their floor or in the broader group constituted bad 
WHDPPDQDJHUVRU³ROGER\V´DQ\IRUPDODVVHVVPHQWRIWKHP± either to demote them from team 
managers or to build a case for their dismissal ± would have to be mediated through a rational 
and objective process divorced from their own opinions. Such methods were not always as 
proficient at correctly and successfully categorizing particular persons as more manageable 
discourse genres, such as hallway banter, were. Relatively simple techniques, such as employee 
satisfaction surveys could be hampered by subordinates who tempered their responses in ways 
favorable to their managers. ([HFXWLYH&KR¶VGHVLUHWRILQGIRUPDODFDGHPLFPRGHOVRI(DVW-
West decision-making processes reflect the necessity of using higher authorities to combat local 
ones.  
Efforts to introduce new office programs, like satisfaction surveys or 360-feedback were 
thwarted less by nefarious intentions or ethically torn employees than by the technical limits of 
expert analysis to connect ideal-type binaries with actual individuals. During my fieldwork, 
([HFXWLYH&KR¶V+53ODQQLQJXQLWKDGWKHWDVNRILPSOHPHQWLQJQHZSROLFLHVWKDWZRXOGFUHDWH
objective evaluations for executives and team managers across the entire group. (These were the 
only two levels at which the headquarters department had the authority to operate within the 
bounds of labor laws.) The program they created, called (as a pseudonym) the New Sangdo 
Development Program (NSDP), provided a new model for evaluating team managers and 
executives on a range of factors. The key basis of this model was not financial performance nor 
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FDUHHUKLVWRU\EXWWKHDEVWUDFWQRWLRQRI³ILWQHVV´RU³DSSURSULDWHQHVV´jeokjeolseong) that a 
team manager or executive would possess as a condition for maintaining their managerial 
function (but not their position as an employee). 
Evaluations as part of NSDP at Sangdo were intended to draw a comprehensive picture of 
managerial qualities that captured different aspects of leadership behavior, with the goal of 
creating a robust set of metrics that could objectively adjudicate between well-fitting and ill-
fitting leadership-types. Because the process of the evaluation for NSDP had to be 
comprehensive and objective, however, it could not show any sign of favoritism or interpretive 
subjectivity. The HR managers had to devise a program that would apply to all managers and 
executives, both good and bad, fairly ± including themselves. Of further difficulty was that the 
method also had to properly capture regularities in interactional behavior, over a period of one 
year, in a metricized way. After conferring with different consulting companies and scouring 
books and websites for appropriate methods and surveys and visualization techniques, the HR 
team eventually decided to use its own customized 360-degree feedback survey and platform to 
gather the voices of employees. 
360-degree feedback selects for certain attributes that are favored or disfavored in the 
evaluation of an individual manager. The survey that the HR team developed was intended to 
redefine the categories of being a Sangdo leader. A previous version of the 360-degree feedback 
had led to problems: evaluators easily inflated the scores of their managers (i.e. by ranking a 
ILYHDQGWKHVXUYH\LWVHOIRQO\SURGXFHGRQHIODWPHWULFRID³JRRG´PDQDJHUW\SH. Analytically, 
the survey structure itself hindered the ability to distinguish managerial qualities beyond just 
³JRRG´RU³EDG´7RFUHDWHDEHWWHULPDJHRIWKHPDQDJHUWKHHR team would have to 
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deconstruct the manager into discrete analytical categories that would then have to be translated 
into questions that employees could reasonably answer. 
The team developed three different survey question types to do this: the first method 
utilized 5-point scale questions that asked respondents to note how often thH\KDG³REVHUYHG´
FHUWDLQEHKDYLRUVRIWKHLUWHDPPDQDJHURUH[HFXWLYHIURP³DOZD\VREVHUYHG´WR³DOPRVWQHYHU
REVHUYHG´7KHVHFRQGPHWKRGZDVDIRUFHG-choice method between two contrasting, but 
positive, qualities, again based on their observational experience. The third asked evaluators to 
grade the subject-area competency in a range of areas, such as business knowledge, analytical 
skills, and strategic planning ability. Throughout, the survey questions implicitly embedded 
value distinctions between thoVHZKR³DOORZRSHQWKLQNLQJ´YHUVXVWKRVHZKR³SOD\E\WKH
UXOHV´WKRVHZKR³HPSKDVL]HQHZLGHDV´YHUVXVWKRVHZKR³HPSKDVL]HHIILFLHQF\´DQLQGLUHFW
way of distinguishing the style of experts, such as those in the headquarters, and the (assumed) 
opposing skills of subsidiary managers or older executives. 
Each of these three areas hid any higher-order characterization of bad managers by 
avoiding direct questions, while also forcing employees to choose between types, preventing any 
tendency for score inflation. Only after the survey results were complete were answers rendered 
LQWRVXSHURUGLQDWHFDWHJRULHV7KHILUVWVHWRITXHVWLRQVFRUUHODWHGWR³YDOXHV´E\XVLQJ
behavioral observations to assess whether the manager/executive was living up to the ideals of 
WKHJURXS7KHVHFRQGFRUUHODWHGZLWK³OHDGHUVKLSVW\OH´WRLQGLFDWHZKDWNLQGRIOHDGHURQHZDV
EDVHGRQFRQWUDVWLQJIHDWXUHV$QGWKLUG³ZRUNH[HFXWLRQ´MXGJHGPDQDJHULDODSWLWXGHDJDLQVWD
standard set of processes involved in managing. Each of these modes of representations selected 
IRUGLIIHUHQWPDQDJHULDOTXDOLWLHVWKDWFRXOGVFDOHXSWRFUHDWHDFRPSRVLWHLPDJHRI³PDQDJHULDO-
QHVV´ZKRVHGLIIHUHQWPHWULFVPLJKWLQGLFDWHUHODWLYH³ILWQHVV´IRUWKHLUSRVLWLRQ7DNHQWRJHWKHU
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they iconically captured the comprehensive features of a manager, in much the same way health 
GLDJQRVWLFVIRUPD³WRWDO´SLFWXUHRIKHDOWK7KHSRWHQWLDOXVHVRIWKHVHZHUHQRWDVEDOGDV
simple evaluation and dismissal, however. The HR team envisioned creating ideal-type manager 
styles for different office functions, like finance or strategy, such that a manager who was a 
³FRQWUROOLQJW\SH´LQDGHSDUWPHQWWKDWQHHGHGD³IRUZDUG-ORRNLQJ´W\SHPLJKWEHVHHQWREHWKH
ZURQJ³ILW´DQGMXVWLI\the relegation of the team manager title or a transfer to the ³ULJKW´WHDP 
After the initial run of the 360-degree feedback results and analysis, I am not certain how 
the NSDP ultimately affected specific team managers or executives across the group, as 
individual personnel records are kept confidential and executive decisions were made behind 
closed doors. However, two unexpected problems emerged: one, the new composite image of the 
new manager did not generate the clear-FXW³W\SHV´WKDWWKH+5PDQDJHUVKDGHQYLVLRQHG7KH
vagaries of numbers indicated that they would not have a clear picture of a given manager¶V
profile only after a few years when any trend could be properly aggregated and seen. Second, the 
survey generated unexpected results for those that were not expected to receive bad results: a 
minor commotion was caused when an executive in the headquarters, himself decidedly not an 
old boy, received some of the lowest evaluations in the whole group, reflecting the fact that bad 
managerial qualities could cohere in persons outside of the figure of alterity itself. 
Conclusion  
The image of the besuited corporate office worker has endured as an aspirational, if out-of-reach, 
capitalist figure in Korea and Japan, despite its dismantling in the West as an element in formal 
office culture. Yet we may find cross-cultural parallels in the kinds of enfigurement-
differentiation processes that I have discussed here: in the US, the function of management itself 
reached its institutional peak in the 1950s where it was a mark of modern (male) virtue, 
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professional aspiration, and a vital part of hybrid administrative-collectivist ideals of a 
coordinated, professional society (cf. Miller and O'Leary 1989). By the 1970s, management as a 
field was reduced to an image of a ³KLUHGKDQG´WKDWVHUYHGWRFDUU\RXWWKHGHVLUHVRI
shareholders, the true agents of capital. Furthermore, the virtues associated with managing 
people had shifted to the virtues of analyzing information (Khurana 2007). Today, new job-
seekers in the US stress over their independent and entrepreneurial qualities, not their company 
loyalties or desires for progressing up a managerial chain (Gershon 2014). Ushering in these tidal 
shifts in discourses around American management and labor subjectivities was a figure of 
masculine alterity ± the middle manager ± that came to embody everything seemingly wrong 
with the corporate-bureaucratic style criticized in the 1970s: homogeneous, lacking ambition, 
inefficient, obedient to authority, and resistant to change ± known in particular by the sartorial 
PHWRQ\PRIWKH³JUD\IODQQHOVXLW.´ By the 1990s, US business discourse had promoted explicit 
LGHDVRI³QHZ PDQDJHPHQW´WKDWVRXJKWWRWUDQVIRUPDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ-oriented managers into free 
agents who could contribute to organizational goals through discrete areas of knowledge, not 
delegations of power (see, for instance, Drucker 1992). In contrast, older managers were 
castigated, such as Ho¶Vdescription of negative accounts of older Wall Street workers DV³clock-
watching,´³µVWDJQDQW¶µIDW¶µOD]\¶µGHDGZRRG¶WKDWQHHGVWREHµSUXQHG¶´+R2009: 252, cited 
in Wilf 2015). Indeed, the aesthetic of a new Silicon Valley management style marked by casual 
dress code, flat structures, and informal communication, takes inspiration directly from an 
opposition to the vertical, formal, and serious images of office cultures in the past, and one that 
cohered directly in the figure of the ³RUJDQL]DWLRQPDQ´ (Whyte 1956). In this way, despite the 
IDFWWKDW³PDQDJHPHQW´LWVHOILVDYDJXHHPSLULFDOFDWegory with little consensus around its 
precise location or function (see Grey 1999), figures of management cohere to provide stable 
 28 
 
cultural or institutional referents for shifting value regimes. Where new spirits of capitalism can 
channel transcendental aspirations, old spirits are not just dismantled, but play a vital role in 
morally justifying their shift as well as shaping the structural and oppositional character of such 
µnew¶spirits themselves.  
In this article, I have discussed a case in which the figure of the Korean office worker, 
once reputed as the hardworking figure whose diligence propelled Korea into a compressed, 
industrialized modernity, has become divided. Older male managers are not only seen as 
outdated, but parasitic on future forms of merit-worthy capitalism in the new moral economy of 
Korean corporate labor. This particular figure of alterity is not a social outcast but precisely one 
who lies at the heart of FRQWHPSRUDU\.RUHDQFDSLWDOLVP¶Vmost valued positions. While publicly 
circulating, mediatized discourses enfigure the older manager as a coherent person who reacts 
emotionally and abuses others through a limited set of recognizable signs, the coherency of this 
enfigurement is more diffuse within actual organizations, from individual displays of 
differentiation to highly indirect management programs. This complexity produces a less 
coherent figure, but strangely one that also seems to permeate all dimensions of office life, 
making the process of µde-managerializing¶ corporations an ongoing effort, as any individual 
instance of managers behaving badly can be taken as a sign of the (continued) presence of the 
ILJXUH¶VVWUXFWXUDOSUHVHQFH. For morally likeable figures, such as the gossipy female secretarial 
ZRUNHUGLVFXVVHGE\2JDVDZDUD¶V(1998) in the Japanese office or the French factory worker 
who uses company time for personal work (Anteby 2003), counter-corporate efforts can appear 
as admirable attempts at resisting formal structures and norms; for negative figures like the older 
male manager, they appear as persistent structural problems, creating a sense of institutional 
failure, as efforts to devalue older male manager presence in one domain (such as by changing 
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after-work socializing practices) are met up their continued presence in others (such as in 
surveys). Indeed, these efforts have been ongoing before the time of my research in the 2010s 
and before the 1997 financial crisis: Korean companies began to implement horizontal team 
structures and team manager roles in the 1990s. Nominally about workplace efficiency, many 
companies effectively delinked individual rank from administrative authority, rendering the 
previously powerful bujang (OLWHUDOO\³GHSDUWPHQWmanager´) into an authority in title only. In its 
stead, a new class of ³team managerV´ (timjang) was selected by merit, not tenure, and thus 
became the elected and rightful managers of the new basic work unit ± the ³team´ (Park 2006). 
To the degree that the older male manager persists as a figure of alterity across these various 
institutional points of articulation and periods of time suggests that those in corporate 
organizations are equally captured by this categorical binary as a way of imagining and 
embedding figured distinctions into organizational projects. 
The problem of management hierarchy fits within a conventional narrative of temporal 
reckoning: an outdated employment paradigm from the 1970s must be overcome on the way to 
flatter, friendlier, and younger offices, the symbol of a later, advanced stage of global (non-
managerial) capitalism. Workers who might have been born in the 1970s strangely seem to 
embody the work culture of that period as well. In this way, personified figures embodied in real 
persons are not just people within the office, but can reify perceptions of such institutions, 
providing the impetus for extensive institutional reform in ways that affects all workers. Beyond 
the ageist and differentiated critiques of certain forms of labor that are not seen to merit 
protection, we should be wary of the way these assumptions redouble both developmentalist 
discourses of economic and social progress for certain types of subjects, as well as global shifts 
in economic ideology that have gradually devalued and dismantled WKH³VRFLHW\RIRUJDQL]DWLRQV´
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(Davis 2012) as an aged model. The presence of a problematic and pervasive figure makes these 
shifts seem morally self-evident, providing justification for their extensive and ongoing reform, 
while cloaking other, not-yet-enfigured authorities that may be harder to spot.  
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1
 Sangdo, like other large groups, is a conglomerate with a holding company structure and multiple subsidiary 
companies. The specific office I worked in was the holding company which had a majority share in most of the 
subsidiaries in the group and I informally refer to as the headquarters. All corporate and personal names used in the 
article are pseudonyms and various details have been changed to prevent identification.  
2
 ³µ2OGPHQKDYHJRWWRJR¶&RUSRUDWLRQV¶UDQNGLHW´>Gocham dduigehara: gieopdeul jig-JHXSGDLHRWHX´]. 
Published April 10, 2015. http://news.donga.com/3/01/20150410/70623742/1 
3
 Despite many parallels with Japan, Korean office workers are not generally referred to as salarymen. The gender-
neutral terms hoesawon (company member) or jig-won (staff ) are used. Gendered points of differentiation emerge 
through terms as ³6DPVXQJ-PDQ´ RU³+\XQGDL-PDQ´ metonyms signaling the importance of RQH¶Vplace of 
employment, not professional category itself. 
4
 )RURWKHUGLVFXVVLRQVRIERWKV\PSDWKHWLFDQG³GLUW\´ILJXUHV in Korea see discussion of female call center workers 
who smoke in Kim (2015) and self-VW\OHGLQWHUQHW³IUHDNV´pye-in) in Yang (2017). 
5
 According to Lett (1998), the figure of the yangban (landed aristocrat) may have disappeared sociologically in the 
twentieth century, but it nevertheless continued to provide the model for status-conscious, upwardly mobile middle-
class success. 
6
 See Krause-Jensen (2011) IRUDXVHIXOGLVFXVVLRQRIZRUNHUV¶DFWVRIUROHGLVWDQFLQJLQWKHFRQWH[WRI'DQLVKRIILFH
ZRUNHUVSLFNLQJXSWKHPHVIURP.XQGD¶V(1992) work on workplace cynicism towards management ideology.  
  
7
 ³The youthful comrades forged their assertive identity against the foil of a sinister, secretive, gendered 
gerontocracy; significantly, those attacked were referred to as µold ladies,¶ even when they were PHQ´&RPDURII
and Comaroff 1999, 288). 
8
 Choi (2018 [2016]) KDVGHVFULEHGWKHHPHUJHQFHDQGFLUFXODWLRQRIDW\SLILHGKXPRUJHQUHNQRZQDV³ajae´
[middle-aged man] gags. More than a narrative genre, such gags are cited by young people and women to mark 
middle-aged men as particularly not funny.  
9
 Criticisms of older women figures are not absent but circulate around mother figures overly ambitious for middle-
class status, such as described by Nelson (2000) or Abelmann (2003). To this point, Schober (2018) has recently 
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described how men and women labor activists are lionized differently in popular protest. An exception may be the 
wealthy class of chaebol family owners, for whom men and women seem equally subject to public scorn. 
10
 Thus, it is not just a hierarchical relationship itself, but the abuse of the privileges of an intimate hierarchy. Most 
dyadic social relations in Korea rely on dyadic relationships of superiority and subordination, occurring even among 
young children (Ahn 2016). 
11
 The basic managerial ranks (sawon, daeri, gwajang, chajang, bujang) encode clear managerial authority in their 
morphology: bujang for instance, is the head (-jang) of a department (bu-). However, since the 1990s, these roles 
have increasingly been semantically vacuated and now stand purely as ordinal status markers.  
12
 These were overheard at lunch where I was not able to write down notes. They were partially reconstructed from 
my memory and with the help of anothHULQWHUQZKRZDVDOVRSUHVHQWZKRP,KDGDVNHGWRFODULI\([HFXWLYH.DQJ¶V
comments. 
13
 See Inoue (2003) IRUGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHµWUDQVGXFWLRQ¶RI-DSDQHVHZRPHQ¶VODQJXDJHZLWK$PHULFDQZKLWH
ZRPHQ¶VODQJXDJH 
14
 The well-NQRZQ.RUHDQPRYLH³2OG%R\´E\3DUN&KDQ-wook hinges on forgotten acquaintances from 
high school. 
15
 ,QWKHQDWLRQDOLVWDFFRXQWVRILQGXVWULDOKLVWRU\.RUHDKDVRIWHQEHHQFDWHJRUL]HGDV³PDQDJHULDO´VW\OHLQZKLFK
managers are circulated and trained in a wide variety of disciplines such as accounting, HR, strategy, and operations. 
See Vogel (1991). 
16
 This is not to say that Team Manager Jang did not participate in certain tropes of a male Korean work culture, 
such as smoking or drinking. However, he was conscious in his efforts not to impinge upon his team members below 
him.  
17
 These problems seem directly rooted in the physical presence of a boss. When a boss is on vacation, employees 
mention that they too are on a vacaWLRQ2QHHPSOR\HHRQFHGHVFULEHGGD\VZLWKRXWWKHERVVDV³NLG¶VGD\´eorinui 
nal$QGWKHVHSUHVVXUHVDUHUHODWHGWRRQH¶VGLUHFWERVVHVQRWERVVHVIURPRWKHUGHSDUWPHQWV7KLVGLIIHUVIURP
-DSDQZKHUH³GHDWKIURPRYHUZRUN´karoshi) is a widely reported phenomenon that stems from pressure by a 
general sense of work overload, not particular bosses. 
18
 Some groups do highlight how unique character traits of the founder should stand as a virtuous model to follow 
but the brand itself is rarely personified as such. 
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 ,QSDUDOOHOWKHZRUGIRU³FRPSDQ\´DOVRIROORZVWKLVSDWWHUQFritical media in Korea prefer the word chaebol 
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themselves such as daegieop (large corporation) or simply hoesa (company/firm). 
